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Abstract
Water is an essential good for human life but there is controversy on whether it
should be allocated using markets. In 1966, the irrigation community in Mula (Murcia,
Spain) switched from a market institution, an auction which had been in place in
the town for over 700 years, to a system of ﬁxed quotas with a ban on trading to
allocate water from the town's river. We present a model in which farmers face liquidity
constraints (LC) to explain why the new, non-market institution is more eﬃcient. We
show that farmers underestimate water demand in the presence of LC. We use a dynamic
demand model and data from the auction period to estimate both farmers' demand for
water and their ﬁnancial constraints, thus obtaining unbiased estimates. In our model,
markets achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation only in the absence of LC. In contrast, quotas
achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation only if farmers are homogeneous in productivity. We
compute welfare under both types of institutions using the estimated parameters. We
ﬁnd that the quota is more eﬃcient than the market. This result implies that one should
be cautious in advocating for water markets, especially in developing areas where LC
might be a concern.
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1 Introduction
Water allocation is a central concern of policy discussions around the world. Seventy percent
of fresh water usage worldwide is for irrigation. Water scarcity is extremely acute in places
such as India, Latin America, and the U.S. (Vörösmarty et al., 2010). Water markets (e.g.
water auctions) are emerging as the preferred institution to allocate water in the developed
world, particularly in dry regions of the U.S. and Australia (Grafton et al., 2011). In the
absence of frictions, a water auction is eﬃcient because it allocates water according to the
valuation of the bidders. When frictions are present, however, markets may not be eﬃcient.
Consider, for example, the friction that arises when bidders may not have enough cash to
pay for water won in an auction (i.e. some bidders may be liquidity constrained). An
auction allocates water to the highest bidders who are not liquidity constrained. A market
failure occurs if some bidders, who are liquidity constrained, have higher valuations than the
bidders who are not liquidity constrained. In such a case, other mechanisms may allocate
water more eﬃciently than auctions.
When water markets are used, they are usually regulated (rather than a free market). In
regulated water markets, a common measure of eﬃciency is to infer gains from trade from
price diﬀerences. Such a measure is diﬃcult due to barriers across districts and diﬀerent
regulatory frameworks. Recovering demand in such cases requires strong assumptions about
market participants (Libecap, 2011).
In this paper, we analyze how a market institution (an auction system) performs rela-
tive to a non-market institution (a quota system as described below) as a water allocation
mechanism in the presence of frictions. The data in this paper comes from water auctions
in a self-governed community of farmers in Mula, Spain. This allows us to exploit a unique
scenario where a free market institution operated under a stable regulatory framework for
over 700 years. From around 1244 until 1966, citizens of Mula used auctions to allocate water
from their river among farmers. The farmers used this water for agricultural purposes. In
1966, the auction system was replaced by a quota system. Under the quota system, farmers
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who owned a plot of fertile land were entitled to a ﬁxed amount of waterproportional to
the size of their plotfor irrigation.
Frictions arose in Mula when farmers did not have enough cash in the summer to purchase
water from the auction. We provide evidence of these liquidity constraints (LC) in Section
2.4. Under the auction system, the price of water increased substantially in summer because
(i) the agricultural products cultivated in the region (apricots, peaches, oranges, etc.) needed
more water during this season when fruit grows more rapidly, increasing demand for water
in the auction; and (ii) weather seasonalities in southern Spain generated less rainfall in
summer than in winter. These conditions made summer the critical season.
In the lead article of the ﬁrst volume of the American Economic Review, Coman (1911)
pointed out this issue: In southern Spain, where this system obtains and water is sold at
auction, the water rates mount in a dry season to an all but prohibitive point. This means
that during the critical season, only wealthy farmers could aﬀord to buy water. But poor
farmers with the same production technology (i.e. the same agricultural products) would
also beneﬁt from buying water during the critical season. Indeed, we ﬁnd that poor farmers
bought less water during the critical season than wealthy farmers who had the same type of
agricultural products and the same number of trees. A natural question arises: How did the
institutional change from auctions to quotas aﬀect welfare in the presence of LC?
There is no consensus among historians about how this institutional change impacted
water allocation eﬃciency. Some contemporaneous observers argued that auctions were
eﬃcient. The following quotation is from historian Musso y Fontes: When the farmer
irrigates for free, he demands a lot of water. When he is paying for the water, he demands as
little as possible. With the auction, the allocation [of water] occurs at the proper level (cited
by Muñoz, 2001). However, Musso y Fontes himself owned water property rights. Observers
without water property rights argued that auctions allocated water ineﬃciently during the
critical season. One of these observers was the director of the National Engineering School,
Juan Subercase: [The Waterlords sell the water] piece by piece, during the critical season
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when the crops are at risk, speculating [. . . ] over the desperate and distressed farmer, who is
willing to make the highest sacriﬁce in order to get a drop of water (cited by Muñoz, 2001).1
Indeed, most of the other towns in the region employed the quota system for centuries (e.g.
Murcia, Caravaca, Jumilla, etc.). Mula's auction system was the exception, not the rule.
Subercase's argument also helps to explain why the farmers of Mula were happy to switch
from the auction system to the quota system (González Castaño and Llamas Ruiz, 1991).
In this paper, we empirically investigate how this institutional changefrom auctions
to quotasaﬀected eﬃciency as a measure of welfare. We propose an econometric model
in which water for irrigation has diminishing returns and farmers are heterogeneous in two
dimensions: their willingness to pay (productivity) and their ability to pay for the water (cash
holdings). In the absence of LC, an auction system achieves the ﬁrst-best (FB) allocation.
On the other hand, in the absence of heterogeneity in the farmers' productivity, a ﬁxed quota
system achieves the FB allocation.2 In our empirical setting farmers are heterogeneous in
their productivity and some farmers are liquidity constrained. In this general case, the
eﬃciency of auctions relative to quotas is ambiguous. It is then an empirical question to
assess which of these institutions is more eﬃcient. To the best of our knowledge, there has
been no empirical study that investigates the eﬃciency of auctions relative to quotas in the
presence of liquidity constrained bidders.
We start our empirical analysis by estimating the demand for water under the auction
system. To estimate demand, it is necessary to account for three features of the empirical
setting. First, irrigation increases the moisture level of the land, thus reducing future demand
for water. It creates an intertemporal substitution eﬀect where water today is an imperfect
substitute for water tomorrow because it evaporates over time. This introduces dynamics
into the irrigation demand system, similar to those of demand for storable goods. The soil
1Both translations from the original in Spanish are ours.
2If capital markets are perfect or if all farmers are suﬃciently wealthy, then the auction system achieves
the FB allocation. If there is no heterogeneity (i.e. if all farmers have the exact same production function),
then the quota system achieves the FB allocation. If there is no heterogeneity and all farmers are suﬃciently
wealthy, then both mechanisms (auctions and quotas) achieve the FB allocation.
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moisture level plays an analogous role to that of inventory in storable goods demand systems
(e.g. Hendel and Nevo, 2006). Second, some farmers are liquidity constrained. Wealthy
farmers strategically delay their purchases and buy water during the critical season, when
agricultural products need water the most. Poor farmers, who may be liquidity constrained,
buy water before the critical season in anticipation of price increases. Finally, weather
seasonality increases water demand during the critical season, when fruit grows more rapidly.
Seasonality shifts the whole demand system, conditional on intertemporal substitution and
LC.
To account for the intertemporal substitution eﬀect, we condition on the moisture level
of the soil, a key determinant of water demand. The moisture level is not directly observable
(similar to Hendel and Nevo, 2006, where the inventory is not directly observed). However,
we observe rainfall and irrigation. We apply ﬁndings from the agricultural engineering liter-
ature to construct a moisture variable for each farmer. The moisture variable measures the
amount of water accumulated in each farmer's plot.
We show that ignoring the presence of LC biases the estimated (inverse) demand and
demand elasticity downwards. To see this, consider the decrease in demand due to an increase
in price during the critical season. When farmers are liquidity constrained, the decrease in
demand has two components: (1) the decrease in demand due to the price being greater than
the valuation of certain farmers; and (2) the decrease in demand due to some farmers being
liquidity constrained, even when their valuation is above the prevailing price. If we do not
account for the second component, we would attribute this decrease in demand to greater
price sensitivity. Thus, one would incorrectly interpret LC as more elastic demand, biasing
the estimated demand downwards.
To identify LC, we use the fact that wealthy farmers are never liquidity constrained, while
poor farmers may be liquidity constrained. We focus on the set of farmers who only grow
apricot trees and who thus share the same production function. Water, in our setting, is an
intermediate good used to produce apricots. Thus, the demand for water is independent of
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the income (or wealth) of the farmer as long as the farmer has enough cash to pay for the
water (i.e. no income eﬀects).
In our econometric model, the farmer's utility has three components. First, the apri-
cot production function that transforms water into apricots. This production function is
obtained from the agricultural engineering literature. Second, the cost of producing the
apricots, measured as the amount spent on water plus an irrigation cost. Finally, an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock that is farmer speciﬁc. Conditional on the soil moisture level, the
type of agricultural product (i.e. apricot), and the number of trees, farmers' productivity
is assumed to be homogeneous up to the idiosyncratic shock. This gives us the exclusion
restriction to identify the other source of heterogeneity, LC.
As mentioned above, estimating demand using data for all farmers results in an un-
derestimation of the price elasticity of demand. But wealthy farmers are never liquidity
constrained. So we estimate demand using only data on wealthy farmers. For the estima-
tion, we construct a conditional choice probability estimator (Hotz and Miller, 1993). We
then use the estimated demand system and data on poor farmers to estimate the probability
for poor farmers of being liquidity constrained each week. We rely on the variation of two
sources of ﬁnancial heterogeneity, urban real estate value and revenue from previous years'
harvests, in order to identify these parameters.
We use the estimated demand system to compare welfare under auctions, quotas, and
the ﬁrst-best allocation. We consider the following allocation mechanisms: (1) Auctions,
Ac, wherein water units are assigned to the farmer who bought them as observed in the
data; (2) Quotas with sequential assignment, QX%, wherein every time we observe that
a farmer bought a unit of water, the complete unit of water is assigned among the X% of
farmers who went without irrigation the longest, proportional to their amount of land; and
(3) the ﬁrst-best allocation, FB, wherein every time we observe that a farmer bought a unit
of water, the complete unit of water is assigned to the farmer who values water the most.
We show that the following ranking holds in terms of eﬃciency: FB > Q25% > Ac. In
5
Q25%, complete units of water are allocated among the 25% of farmers who have received less
water in the past, in proportion to amount of land. The welfare under Q25% is greater than
under Ac. Quotas increase eﬃciency when units are allocated according to Q25%, which is
a result of the concavity of the production function,the presence of LC, and the absence of
heterogeneity in farmers' productivity (all farmers have the same production function: the
apricot production function). Under Q25% there are still gains to be made relative to the
FB allocation, suggesting that there is some heterogeneity in productivity. In Mula, the
quota allocation mechanism was close to Q25% because every farmer was assigned a certain
amount of water every three weeks, proportional to their plot's size (González Castaño and
Llamas Ruiz (1991).3
In summary, we make three main contributions: (1) we combine a novel data set, in-
cluding detailed ﬁnancial and individual characteristic information, with a new econometric
model to estimate demand in the presence of storability, LC, and seasonality; (2) we inves-
tigate the eﬃciency of auctions relative to quotas in the presence of liquidity constrained
bidders by exploring a particular historical institutional change in southern Spain (Mula);
(3) from an historical perspective, we conclude that the Mula institutional change was wel-
fare improving because the quota system more often allocated water units following farmers'
valuations than did the auction system.
1.1 Literature Review
Scholars studying the eﬃciency of irrigation communities in Spain have proposed two com-
peting hypotheses to explain the coexistence of auctions and quotas. On the one hand, Glick
(1967) and Anderson and Mass (1978) claimed that auctions are more eﬃcient than quotas,
absent operational costs. They argued that both systems are nevertheless observed because
the less eﬃcient system (quotas) is simpler and easier to maintain. Hence, once operational
3In Q50%, complete units of water are allocated among the 50% of farmers who have received less water
in the past, in proportion to their amount of land. The welfare under Q50% is similar to the welfare under
Ac. In Q100%, complete units of water are allocated uniformly at random among all farmers, in proportion
to amount of land. The welfare under Q100% is lower than under Ac. See Section 6 for details.
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costs are take into account, quotas are more eﬃcient than auctions in places with less water
scarcity. This hypothesis is supported by observations of auctions in places where water is
extremely scarce (Musso y Fontes, 1847; Pérez Picazo and Lemeunier, 1985). On the other
hand, many contemporaneous and current historians who study the traditional organizations
of the Spanish Huertas (irrigated orchards) took a diﬀerent approach.4 They argued that the
owners of the water rights had political power and were concerned only with their revenues,
regardless of the overall eﬃciency of the system.
Along the same lines, Garrido (2011) has claimed that auctions were used in places where
the local elite was powerful. Therefore, we would expect a quota system only if the local
elite is not powerful (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). As Rodriguez Llopis (1998) pointed
out, the institutional conﬁguration in place in each town by the end of the Middle Ages was
the outcome of tensions between the Crown, the Castilian aristocracy, the regional nobility,
and the local elites in existence since the 13th century. Nonetheless, none of these scholars
considered whether auctions might be less eﬃcient than quotas. (See Espín-Sánchez, 2015,
for a discussion of the institutional change.)
The eﬀect that imperfect capital markets have in the real economy has also been studied
in the development literature. Udry (1994) studied how state-contingent loans are used
in rural Nigeria to partially insured a bad harvest. Jayachandran (2013) showed how the
presence of LC among land owners in Uganda can make an upfront payment in cash much
more eﬀective than the promise of future payments.
We are not aware of any empirical paper analyzing the eﬀect of LC in an auction setting.
Pires and Salvo (2015) found that low income households buy smaller sized storable prod-
ucts (detergent, toilet paper, etc.) than high income households, even though smaller sized
products are more expensive per pound. They attribute this puzzling result to low income
households being liquidity constrained.
We estimate a dynamic demand model with seasonality and storability. There is a vast
4Contemporaneous historians include Aymard (1864), Díaz Cassou (1889) and Brunhes (1902). Current
historians include González Castaño and Llamas Ruiz (1991).
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literature in empirical industrial organization studying dynamic demand (e. g. Boizot et al.,
2001; Pesendorfer, 2002; Hendel and Nevo, 2006, 2011; Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012).5
None of these papers address how LC aﬀect demand. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
ﬁrst paper that proposes and estimates a demand model with storability, seasonality and LC.
Timmins (2002) studies dynamic demand for water and is closest to our paper. He estimates
demand for urban consumption rather than demand for irrigation. He uses parameters
from the engineering literature to estimate the supply of water. We use parameters from
the agricultural engineering literature to determine the demand structure, as well as soil
moisture levels (see appendix A.2).
2 Historical background and Data
2.1 History and Origins6
During the reign of Ibn Hud (1228-1238), the Kingdom of Murcia enjoyed some prosperity
and stability. When Ibn Hud was murdered in 1238, the kingdom was dismembered. This
same year Jaime I (King of Aragon) conquered Valencia and prepared to march south.
Castile was also advancing to the south, expanding its territory at the expense of the now
fragile Kingdom of Murcia. By 1242, Castile had conquered most of the Kingdom. Ahmed,
the son of Ibn Hud, traveled to Alcaraz (Toledo) to meet prince Alfonso. They agreed that
what remained of the Kingdom of Murcia would become a protectorate of Castile.
The cities of Mula and Lorca rejected this agreement. In April 1244, Alfonso was in
Murcia with his army ready to attack Mula (the closest of the rebel cities). After Mula was
conquered, the army moved to Lorca, which surrendered by the end of June. The government
of Mula and Lorca was given to the Order of Santiago, while the government of the city of
Murcia was given, in part, to the descendants of Ibn Hud according to the terms of the
5See Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2013) for a recent survey.
6This section is based on Rodriguez Llopis (1998).
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Alcaraz Treaty. However, the Order of Santiago and the Order of the Temple had absolute
authority over the cities of Mula and Lorca respectively, since the cities were conquered by
force. As with much of the Spanish Reconquista, Christian populations were brought to the
area with the goal of establishing a Christian base. Hence, the new Christian settlers in
Mula started tabula rasa and created new institutions (see Espín-Sánchez, 2015).7
Under these new institutions, the owners of the water property rights (Waterlords)
were diﬀerent persons than the land owners (farmers). The Waterlords established a well-
functioning cartel (Heredamiento de Aguas) which lasted through the pre-modern era, despite
the many political changes that occurred in Spain. The land owners were small proprietors,
with family-size plots, who soon after created their own association, Sindicato de Regantes.
2.2 Environment
Southeastern Spain is the most arid region of Europe. It is located to the east of a mountain
chain, the Prebaetic System. Most years are dryer than the average. There are only a few
days of torrential rain but they are of high intensity. For example, 681 millimeters (mm) of
water fell in Mula on one day, 10th October 1943, while the yearly average in Mula is 326
mm. Summers are dry and rain falls mostly during fall and spring. Insolation is the highest
in Europe. Rivers ﬂowing down the Prebaetic System provide the region with the water
needed for irrigation.
Weekly prices for water in the auctions are volatile. They depend on the season of the
year and the amount of rainfall. But rainfall is hard to predict, making diﬃcult to predict
the need for cash to buy water in the auction. Water demand is seasonal, peaking during
the weeks before the harvest when fruit grows most rapidly. Farmers sell their output after
the harvest (once per year). Only then the farmers collect the cash (revenue) from growing
their agricultural products. Hence, the weeks when farmers need cash the most to pay for
water in the auctions (the weeks before the harvest) are the weeks farthest away from the
7Notice that this initial shock in institutions is similar to that in Chaney (2008).
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last harvest (the last time they collected the revenue). As a consequence, poor farmers who
do not have other sources of revenue may be liquidity constrained.
Given that demand is seasonal, farmers take into account the joint dynamics of their
demand for water and of the prices of water in the auction when making purchasing decisions.
Water today is an imperfect substitute for water tomorrow. Future prices of water are
diﬃcult to predict. Farmers consider current prices of water and form expectations about
future prices of water. A farmer who expects to be liquidity constrained during the critical
seasonwhen the demand is highestmay decide to buy water several weeks before the
critical season, when the price of water is lower. We allow for farmers to save so that after
a rainy year with low water prices, they are less likely to be liquidity constrained.
A farmer who expects to be liquidity constrained in the future will try to borrow money.
However, poor farmers in Mula did not have access to credit markets.8 However, even if
a credit market is in place, loans may not be granted. In the presence of limited liability
(i.e. the farmer is poor) and non-enforceable contracts (i.e. poor institutions), endogenous
borrowing constraints emerge (see Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004, for a model of endoge-
nous liquidity constraints). Hence, even if a credit market exists, non-enforceable contracts
would prevent the farmer from having cash when they need it most.9
2.3 Institutions
In this subsection, we describe two institutions that allocated water from the river to farmers
in most cities of southeastern Spain.
8Personal interviews with surviving farmers conﬁrm that some farmers were liquidity constrained they
did not have enough cash to buy their desired amount of water yet they did not borrow money from others.
9In contrast to German credits cooperatives (Guinnane, 2001), the farmers in southeastern Spain were
not able to create an eﬃcient credit market. Spanish farmers were poorer then German farmers and, more
importantly, the weather shocks were aggregate (not idiosyncratic) and greater in magnitude. Hence, in
order to reduce the risk, Spanish farmers should resort to external ﬁnancing. However, external ﬁnancing
have problems such as monitoring costs and information acquisition that credit cooperatives do not have.
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Auctions. Since the 13th century, the mechanism to allocate water among farmers was a
sequential outcry ascending price (or English) auction. The basic structure of this sequential
English auction in use in Spain remained unchanged from the 13th century until 1966, when
the last auction was run. The auctioneer sold by auction each of the units sequentially and
independently of each other. The auctioneer tracked the name of the buyer of every unit
and the price paid by the winner.Farmers had to pay in cash on the day of the auction.10
Water was sold by cuarta (quarter), a unit that denoted the right to use water ﬂowing
through the main channel during three hours at a speciﬁc date and time. Property rights
to water and land were independent: some individuals, not necessarily farmers, were Wa-
terlords. That is, Waterlords owned the right to use the water ﬂowing through the channel.
The other farmers who participated in the auctions owned land.
Water was stored at the main dam (Embalse de La Cierva).11 A system of channels
delivered water to the farmer's plot. Water ﬂowed from the dam through the channels at
approximately 40 liters per second. Each unit of water sold at auction (i.e. the right to use
water from the canal for three hours) carried approximately 432,000 liters of water. During
our sample period, auctions were held once a week, every Friday.
During each session, forty units were auctioned: four units for irrigation during the day
(from 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM) and four units for irrigation during the night (from 7:00 PM
to 7:00 AM) on each weekday (Monday to Friday). The auctioneer ﬁrst sold twenty units
corresponding to the night-time and then twenty units corresponding to the day-time. Within
the day and night groups, units were sold starting with Monday's four units and ﬁnishing
with Friday's units. Our sample consists of all water auctions in Mula from January 1955
until July 1966, when the last auction was run.
10Allowing the farmer to pay after the critical season would help mitigate the problems created by the LC
and would increase the revenue obtained in the auction. The fact that the payment should be made in cash,
as explicitly written in their bylaws, suggests that the water owners were concerned about repayment after
the critical season (i.e. non enforceable contracts).
11This dam was built in 1929. Before this dam was built, water was stored at the smaller dam Azud del
Gallardo.
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Quotas. On August 1, 1966 the allocation system was changed from an auction to a two-
sided bargaining system. In the bargaining system, the Heredamiento de Aguas and the
Sindicato de Regantes ﬁxed a water price, to be renegotiated every six months. Since 1966,
the Sindicato de Regantes has allocated water to each farmer through a ﬁxed quota.
Under this system, water ownership was tied to land ownership. Every plot of land
was assigned some amount of irrigation time during each three week round (quota). The
amount of time allocated to each farmer was proportional to the size of their plot. Every
December, a lottery assigned a farmer's order of irrigation within each round. The order
did not change during the entire year. At the end of the year, farmers paid a fee to the
Sindicato proportional to the size of their plot. Farmers payed after the critical season and
were not liquidity constrained.12 These fees covered the year's operational costs: guard
salaries, channel cleaning, dam maintenance, etc.13
2.4 Data
We examine a unique panel data set where each period represents one week and each indi-
vidual represents one farmer. Thus, the unit of observation is a farmer-week. The data was
collected from four diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst source is the weekly auction. For the period
from January 1955 until the last auction in July 1966 we observe the price paid, the number
of units bought, the date of the purchase, and the date of the irrigation. This data was ob-
tained from the municipal archive of Mula.14 The second source is rainfall measurements.15
The third source is a cross sectional agricultural census from 1955. The census data contains
information regarding the farmer's plots, including type of agricultural product, number of
12The farmer was the owner of the water under the quota system, so the price that the farmer paid was
the average cost of operation, which was smaller that the average price paid per unit of water under the
auction system. A full accounting of costs will include the amortization of the value of water rights.
13During the ﬁrst years of the quota system, the fee also included the payments made to the Heredamiento
de Aguas to buy the water rights.
14From the section Heredamiento de Aguas, boxes No.: HA 167, HA 168, HA 169 and HA 170.
15We obtain the rainfall information from the Agencia Estatal de Metereología, AEMET (the Spanish
National Meteorological Agency).
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trees, production quantity, and sale price.16 The ﬁnal source is real estate tax records from
1955. We later use this information to identify liquidity constraints.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of selected variables used in the empirical analysis.
Detailed information about the data can be found in appendix A.1.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Med Max No. obs.
Weekly rain (mm) 8.29 37.08 0 0 423.00 602
Water price (pesetas)a 326.157 328.45 0.005 217.9 2,007 602
Real estate tax (pesetas) 482.10 1,053.6 0 48 8,715 496
Area (ha) 2.52 5.89 0.024 1.22 100.1 496
Number of treesb 311.3 726.72 3 150 12,360 496
Units bought 0.0295 0.3020 0 0 4 145,684
Notes: This is the sample of all farmers. We found 496 census cards in the archive. We were able to fully match 242 individuals
to the auction data. The agricultural census include farmers who have only secano, or dry, lands and thus, are not in our
sample. The sample after the matching process consists of 602 weeks and 242 individuals for a total of 145,684 observations.
a Water price is the weekly average price in the auction.
b Number of trees includes vines.
Source: Own elaboration.
Auction Data. Auction data (602 weeks) can be divided into three categories based on
bidding behavior and water availability: (i) Normal periods (300), where for each transaction
the name of the winner, price paid, date and time of the irrigation for each auction were
registered; (ii) No-supply periods (295), where due to water shortage in the river or damage
to the dam or channelusually because of intense rainno auction was carried out, and
ﬁnally; (iii) No-demand periods (7), where not all 40 units were sold due to lack of demand
(the price dropped to zero due to recent rain). In the main estimation we use data for the
period 1955-66.
Rainfall Data. In the Mediterranean climate, rainfall occurs mainly during spring and
fall. Peak water requirements for products cultivated in the region are reached in spring
16Detailed census data is obtained from the section Heredamiento de Aguas in the historical archive of
Mula, box No. 1,210.
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and summer, between April and August. The coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall is 450%
(37.08/8.29× 100), indicating that rainfall varies substantially.
Agricultural Census Data. The Spanish government conducted an agricultural census
in 1955 to enumerate all cultivated soil, production crops, and agricultural assets available
in the country. The census recorded the following individual characteristics about farmers'
land: type of land and location, area, number of trees, production, and the price at which
this production was sold in the census year. We match the name of the farmer on each
census card with the name of the winner of each auction.
Urban Real Estate Tax Data. In order to credibly identify the source of ﬁnancial
constraints we require a variable related to farmers' wealth, but unrelated to their demand
for water. We use urban real estate taxes. (Note that farmers grow their agricultural products
in rural areas.) The idea is that farmers with expensive urban real estate are wealthier than
farmers who own inexpensive urban real estate. Thus, farmers with expensive urban real
estate are unlikely to be liquidity constrained. On the other hand, the value of urban real
estate owned should not aﬀect the farmer's production function (i.e. the farmer's willingness
to pay), conditional on the type of agricultural product, the size of the plot, and the number
of trees. Hence, after accounting for these variables the value of the urban real estate should
not be correlated with the farmer's demand for water, which is determined by the production
function of the agricultural product (the apricot production function in our case). We later
use this exclusion restriction to identify liquidity constrained farmers.
2.5 Preliminary Analysis
In this subsection, we provide descriptive patterns from the data. There are four main fruit
tress grown in the area: orange, lemon, peach and apricots. Oranges are harvested in winter
and prices are low during their critical season, thus farmers are unlikely to face liquidity
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constraints (LC). The other three types of trees are harvested in the summer. Among them,
apricots are the most common crop, thus our focus there.
In Table 2, we restrict attention to farmers who grow only apricot trees. The table
displays OLS regressions. We regress the number of units bought by each farmer in a given
week on several covariates. The variable High urban real estate is a variable that equals
one if the value of the urban real estate owned by the farmer is greater than the sample
median, and 0 otherwise. The idea behind this dummy variable is that farmers who are
wealthy enough are never liquidity constrained. They do not have to pay rent for their
houses and they even can collect rent from their urban real estate to obtain cash during the
critical season, ﬁnancing their purchases. Consider two farmers who are growing apricots,
who have the same number of trees, and who are not liquidity constrained. Water demand
is determined by the water need of the tree according to the apricot production function.
These two farmers should have the same demand for water up to an idiosyncratic shock.
Therefore, there is no relationship between the demand for water and the monetary value of
urban real estate.17 Columns 1 and 2 shows that poor farmers buy less water overall.
In columns 3 and 4 we include an interaction between High urban real estate and
Critical season. The variable Critical season is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
observation belongs to a week during the critical season and 0 otherwise.18 During the critical
season the auction price of water increases substantially because farmers need water the most.
In the case of apricots the critical season also coincides with the beginning of summer, when
the prices are highest. The interaction term is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero.
This means that wealthy farmers buy substantially more water than poor farmers during the
critical season. Poor farmers who are liquidity constrained are not able to buy water during
the weeks in which they need it the most. Columns 3 and 4 show that the eﬀect of LC on
the demand for water is concentrated on the critical season.
17We obtain similar results using the 40th or the 60th percentiles of the distribution of urban real estate.
Results are available upon request.
18See appendix A.2 for a discussion on how the critical season is deﬁned.
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Table 2: Demand for Water and Urban Real Estate.
Number of units bought (1) (2) (3) (4)
High urban real estate 0.0255*** 0.0235*** 0.0133** 0.0126*
(0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0066)
(High urban real estate) x (Critical season) 0.0702*** 0.0602***
(0.0117) (0.0122)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 14,448 14,448 14,448 14,448
Notes: All regressions are OLS speciﬁcations. The sample is restricted to farmers who only grow apricots.
The dependent variable is the number of units bought by each individual farmer during a given week. High
urban real estate is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the value of urban real estate of the farmer is above
the median. Critical season is a dummy that equals one if the observation belongs to a week during the
critical season. Covariates are the price paid by farmers in the auction, the amount of rainfall during the
week of the irrigation, the farmer's soil moisture level, and the farmer's number of trees. Standard errors in
parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 3: Relationship between Size and Composition of Plots and Wealth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Area Total
(Ha)
Area with
trees (Ha)
Fraction
with trees
Revenue
(pesetas)
Revenue/ area
(pesetas/m2)
Urban real estate 34,023*** 22,069*** -0.0355 23,894*** -0.1797
(9,747) (7,031) (0.0320) (4,024) (0.7543)
Number of observations 388 388 388 388 388
Notes: All regressions are OLS speciﬁcations. The sample is restricted to farmers who only grow apricots.
The dependent variable is the variable in each column. Urban real estate measures the value of a farmer's
urban real estate in pesetas. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 3 shows that wealthy farmers have bigger plots. One concern that arises in Table 2
is that the eﬀect may be due to diﬀerences in the size of the plots. Since farmers can only buy
whole units, there may be economies of scale in water purchases which only wealthy farmers,
who own bigger plots, can take advantage of. Table 4 displays similar estimates to those in
Table 2 but normalized for the number of trees on each farmer's plot. Columns 3 and 4 show
that a farmer's wealth has no eﬀect on their demand for water outside the critical season.
However, the eﬀect during the critical season is still present. Wealthy farmers demand more
water per tree during the critical season than poor farmers who have the same agricultural
products (here, apricots).
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Table 4: Demand for Water per Tree and Urban Real Estate.
Number of units bought per tree (1) (2) (3) (4)
High urban real estate 0.0131*** 0.0073 0.0066 0.0017
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0047)
(High urban real estate) x (Critical season) 0.0374*** 0.0315***
(0.0091) (0.0094)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 14,448 14,448 14,448 14,448
Notes: All regressions are OLS speciﬁcations. The sample is restricted to farmers who only grow apricots.
The dependent variable is the number of units bought by each individual farmer during a given week per
tree. High urban real estate is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the value of urban real estate of the
farmer is above the median. Critical season is a dummy that equals one if the observation belongs to a
week during the critical season. Covariates are the price paid by farmer in the auction, the amount of
rainfall during the week of irrigation, and the farmer's soil moisture level. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Figure 1: Seasonal Stages for Búlida Apricot trees.
Notes: Source: Pérez-Pastor et al. (2009).
Water Demand and Apricot Trees. Figure 1 displays the seasonal stages of the typical
apricot tree that is cultivated in Mula, the búlida apricot. These trees need the most water
during the late fruit growth (stages II and III) and the early post harvest (EPH). This
deﬁnes the critical irrigation season for apricots trees (see Torrecillas et. al. 2000 for
details). Stage III corresponds to the period when the tree transforms water into fruit at
the highest rate. The EPH period is important because of the hydric stress the tree suﬀers
during the harvest (see Pérez-Pastor et. al. 2009 for further details).
The top panel in Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of weather seasonality on auction water prices.
The ﬁgure displays the average weekly prices of water and the average weekly rainfall in
Mula. The shaded area corresponds to the critical season as deﬁned above. The price of
water increases substantially during the critical season because (1) apricots, along with other
products cultivated in the region, require more irrigation during this season, increasing the
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demand for water in the auction; and (2) weather seasonalities in southern Spain generate
less rainfall during these months (top panel in Figure 2).
The bottom panel in Figure 2 shows the purchasing patterns of wealthy and poor apricot
farmers. The ﬁgure displays the average liters per tree that each farmer purchased in the
auction. Wealthy farmerswho are not liquidity constraineddemand water as predicted
by Figure 1. Wealthy farmers strategically delay their purchases and buy water during
the critical season, when the apricot trees most need water. On the other hand, poor
farmerswho may be liquidity constraineddisplay a bimodal purchasing pattern for water.
The ﬁrst peak occurs before the critical season, when water prices are relatively low (see top
panel). Poor farmers buy water before the critical season because they anticipate that they
may not be able to aﬀord water during the critical season due to increased auction prices.
A fraction of this water will evaporate, but the rest will remain in the soil's moisture of the
farmer.
The second peak occurs after the critical season, when water prices are relatively low
again. After the critical season the moisture level on the plots of the poor farmers is low
if they had not been able to buy suﬃcient water during the critical season. Thus, the
poor farmers buy water after the critical season to prevent the trees from withering. This
purchasing pattern for the poor farmers (high purchases before and after the critical season,
and low purchases during the critical season) can be explained with a model that includes
seasonality, storability and liquidity constrains. That is what we do in section 3.
To identify LC we assume that wealthy and poor apricot farmers have the same pro-
duction function. Although this assumption is untestable, we provide auxiliary evidence to
support it in Table 5. This table shows that among farmers who grow only apricot trees,
wealthy farmers obtain greater revenue than poor farmers. However, if a farmer grows an-
other agricultural product in addition to apricot trees (e.g. oranges), then there are no
substantial diﬀerences between wealthy and poor farmers. Moreover, revenue for oranges
does not depend on the wealth of the farmer either. This is because oranges are harvested in
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Figure 2: Seasonality and Purchasing Patterns of Wealthy and Poor Farmers.
Notes: The top panel displays: (1) the average weekly prices of water paid in the auction (left vertical axis),
(2) the average weekly rain in Mula (right vertical axis), and (3) the critical season for apricots trees as
deﬁned in Figure 1 (shaded area). The bottom panel displays the average liters bought per farmer and per
tree disaggregated by wealthy and poor farmers. A farmer is deﬁned as wealthy if the value of urban real
estate of the farmer is above the median. A farmer is deﬁned as poor if the value of urban real estate of the
farmer is below the median. The shaded area in the bottom panel displays the critical season (identical as
in the top panel).
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winter, unlike apricots that are harvested in the summer when water prices are high. Water
prices during the oranges' harvest season are low, thus LC play no role. Farmers who grow
both apricots and oranges use the cash obtained in winter from the orange harvest to buy
water for the apricots in the summer. Similarly, they use the cash obtained from the apricot
harvest to buy water for the oranges in winter. Hence, they are not aﬀected by LC. Farmers
who only grow apricots do not have access to this cash smoothing mechanism and are
therefore aﬀected by LC.19
The results in Table 5 provide evidence of both LC and low productivity heterogeneity.
Column (1) shows that the average revenue per apricot tree for farmers growing only apricots
is much smaller for poor farmers. Column (2) shows that the revenue per orange tree is similar
for poor and wealthy farmers. Columns (3) shows that the same is true among the farmers
who grow apricots and other crops. The same is true for lemons and peaches. We interpret
these results as evidence that the diﬀerences in revenue observed among the farmers who
only grow apricots are due to diﬀerences in input utilization (e.g. water) used by wealthy
and poor farmers, and not due to diﬀerences in their production function.20
3 The Econometric Model
In this section, we present the econometric model that allows us to compute the welfare
under auctions and under quotas. Computing the welfare would be straightforward with
output data (i.e. production data) before and after the institutional change. But this
output data is not available. So we use detailed input data (units of water purchased,
rainfall amount, number of apricot trees, etc.) along with the apricot production function
(that transforms these inputs into apricots) to compute the output before and after the
19Results for other crops harvested in the summer such as lemons and peaches are similar to those for
apricots.
20When looking at the revenue per tree for wealthy farmers, farmers growing only apricot trees have a
greater revenue than farmers growing also other crops. The reason behind this result is that wealthy farmers
growing only apricot trees have a lower average number of trees (72 trees) than farmers growing also other
crops (109 trees). This is due to disseconomies of scale. The number of trees for poor farmers growing only
apricot trees is 73, thus diseconomies of scale are playing no role when comparing poor and wealthy farmers.
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Table 5: Revenue per tree in 1954 for diﬀerent crops.
Revenue per tree Apricot-only Orange-other Apricot-other Lemon-other Peach-other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 134.21 125.13 124.70 112.92 51.81
Low urban real estate 105.47 131.65 129.69 120.37 47.09
High urban real estate 162.94 119.48 119.23 105.93 55.58
Number of farmers 24 322 239 64 45
Notes: Own elaboration from the 1955 Agricultural census. Apricot-only refers to the revenue generated
by apricot trees for farmers that only grow apricot trees. Apricot-other refers to the revenue generated by
apricot trees for farmers who grow apricot and other trees.Lemon-other refers to the revenue generated by
lemon trees for farmers who grow lemon and other trees. Peach-other refers to the revenue generated by
peach trees for farmers who grow peach and other trees. Orange-other refers to the revenue generated by
orange trees for farmers who grow orange and other trees. High urban real estate is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the value of urban real estate of the farmer is above the median.
institutional change. We proceed in three steps. First, we present the econometric model.
The econometric model uses the apricot production function obtained from the agricultural
engineering literature and incorporates three features of our setting: storability, liquidity
constraints (LC), and seasonality. Second, we estimate the model using the input data.
Finally, we use the estimated model to compute the output under auctions and quotas. This
allow us to perform the counterfactual analysis of welfare (i.e. production of apricot) before
and after the institutional change.
We now describe the econometric model. The economy consists of N farmers, indexed by
i, and one auctioneer. Water increases the farmer's soil moisture level. So, from the point of
view of the farmer, there are two goods in the economy: moisture, M , measured in liters per
square meter (l/m2) and money, µ, measured in pesetas. Time is denoted by t, the horizon is
inﬁnite, and the discount between periods (weeks) is β ∈ (0, 1). Demand is seasonal, hence
some of the functions depend on the season. We denote the season by wt ∈ {1, 2, ..., 52},
representing each of the 52 weeks of any given year. In each period, the supply of water in
the economy is exogenous.
Farmers only get utility for water consumed during the critical season. Water is an
intermediate good. Hence, utility refers to the farmer's proﬁt and is measured in pesetas,
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not in utils. Water bought in any period can be carried forward into the next period, but
it evaporates as indicated by the evolution of the soil moisture in equation 1 (i.e. water
depreciates at some rate δ ∈ (0, 1)).
Farmers' preferences over moisture and money are represented by u (jit,Mit, wt, µit, εijt; γ, σε, χ) =
h (jit,Mit, wt; γ)+εijt−ptjit−ζ+µit, where h (·), is the apricot production function (common
to all farmers) that is strictly increasing and concave in the moisture level of the farmer, Mit
;21 εijt is an additive productivity shock to farmer i in period t given that the farmer bought
jt units of water; pt is a scalar that represents the price of water in the auction in period
t (common to all farmers); jit ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, is the number of units that farmer i buys in
period t; µit is the amount of cash that farmer i has in period t; and (γ, σε, χ) is a vector
of parameters (to be estimated) that we describe below. We require that (µit − ptjit) ≥ 0,
∀jit > 0 (i.e. limited liability). Finally, ζj is a choice-speciﬁc component of the irrigation.
The intuition for including ζ is that the farmer might have to incur an additional cost when
irrigating. This disutility could result, for example, if the farmer hires a laborer to help with
irrigation.
Farmers in the economy diﬀer from each other in two ways. First, they diﬀer in their
productivity shock, εijt. Second, they diﬀer in their wealth levels, µit. We describe the
evolution of the wealth level below. Both εit and µit are private information.
State Variables
There are six state variables in the model:
• Mit (deterministic, measured in l/m2): is the moisture level of the plot. It represents
the amount of water accumulated in the farmer's plot.
• wt (deterministic): is the weekly seasonal eﬀect. Its support is {1, 2, ..., 51, 52}.
• pt (random, measured in pesetas): is the price for each unit of water during week t.
21For the estimation we use a equation 5 (discussed below) obtained from the agricultural engineering
literature. See appendix A.2 for details.
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• rt (random, measured in l/m2): is the amount of rain that fell on the town during
period t.
• it ≡ (i0t, ..., iJt) (random): is a choice speciﬁc component of the utility function.
• µit: represents the amount of cash that the individual has at period t.
Evolution of the State Variables
Moisture. Trees on a farmer's plot die if the soil moisture level falls below the permanent
wilting point, PW , which is a scalar obtained from the agricultural engineering literature.
So each farmer i must satisfy the constraint Mit ≥ PW ∀t. The law of motion for the
moisture, Mit, is given by:
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Mit = min
{
Mi,t−1 + rt +
jit · 432, 000
areai
− ET (Mit, wt) , FC
}
, (1)
where rt is the amount of rainfall (measured in mm) in Mula during period t; jit is the
number of units purchased by farmer i in period t; 432, 000 is the number of liters in each
unit of water; areai is the farmer's plot area (measured in square meters); ET (Mit, wt) is
the adjusted evapotranspiration in period t; and FC is the full capacity of the farmer's
plot. Moisture and seasonality are the main determinants of water demand. The moisture
level increases with rain and irrigation, and decreases over time as the accumulated water
evaporates (evapotranspiration). Although the moisture level is not observable, both rain
and irrigation are observable. We use equation 1 to compute the moisture level.
Weekly Seasonal Eﬀect. The evolution of the weekly season is mechanical:
wt =

wt−1 + 1 if wt−1 < 52
1 if wt−1 = 52
. (2)
22We follow the literature in agricultural engineering to compute the moisture. See appendix A.2 for
details.
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Farming is a seasonal activity. Each crop has diﬀerent water requirements, depend-
ing on the season. The apricot water requirement is captured by the production function,
h (jit,Mit, wt). Since the market for water has a weekly frequency, we have a state variable
with a diﬀerent value for every week of the year.
Price of Water and Rainfall. The main determinant of both water auction prices and
rainfall is seasonality. Our unit of analysis is a week, so we work with average weekly
prices and average weekly rainfall. Average weekly prices and average weekly rainfall vary
substantially across weeks of the year (see Figure 2). However, for a given week, the variation
of prices and rainfall across years is very low (see Donna and Espín-Sánchez, 2015, for details
regarding the evolution of prices in the auctions).
We model the evolution of prices and rainfall to capture these empirical regularities. Our
data covers a sample of 12 years. We assume that, holding ﬁxed the week of the year, farmers
jointly draw a price-rain pair, (pt, rt), among the 12 pairs (i.e. the 12 years of the same week)
available in the data with equal probability.23
Productivity Shock. We assume that the productivity shocks εijt are drawn i.i.d. (across
individuals and over time) from a Gumbel distribution with CDF F (εit;σε) = e
−e−εit/σε ,
where σε is a parameter to be estimated. The variance of this distribution is given by
σ2εpi
2/6. The higher the value of the parameter σε, the more heterogeneous the distribution of
productivity.
Cash Holdings. Farmer i 's cash in period t, µit, evolves according to:
µit = µi,t−1 − pt−1ji,t−1 + Φt (rei;φ) + ηit + νit, (3)
where Φt (rei;φ) = φi0 + φ1rei captures the (weekly) cash ﬂow function derived from the
23We obtain similar results by estimating the joint distribution of prices and rain nonparametrically con-
ditional on the week of the year, and then drawing price-rain pairs from this distribution, conditional on the
week of the year. Results are available upon request.
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real estate value φrei minus individual i's weekly consumption that is constant over time,
φi0; ηit is the revenue the farmer obtains when she sells the harvest (we present the revenue
below in equation 8), and νit is are idiosyncratic ﬁnancial shock that are drawn i.i.d. (across
individuals and over time) from a normal distribution. The revenue ηit is equal to 0 all weeks
of the year, except the week after the harvest, when farmers sell their products and collect
revenue. (See appendix B for details.)
Value Function
The expected discounted utility of farmer i at t = 0 is then:
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt [h (jit,Mit, wt; γ) + εijt − ptjit − ζ + µit]
]
s.t. Mit ≥ PW
s.t. jitpt ≤ µit, jit > 0
,
subject to the evolution of the state variables as described above. The expectation is
taken over rt, pt, εijt, and νit. Note that for wealthy farmers the constraint jitpt ≤ µit is not
binding. Then, the value function is:
V (Mit, wt, pt, rt, µit, ijt) ≡ max
jit∈{0,1,...,J}
{h (jit,Mit, wt; γ) + εijt − ptjit − ζ + µit+
+ βE [V (Mi,t+1, µi,t+1, wt+1, pt+1, rt+1, i,t+1) |Mit, wt, pt, rt, µit, jit]}
s.t. Mit ≥ PW
s.t.jitpt ≤ µit,∀jit > 0
, (4)
subject to the evolution of the state variables as described above.
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The Apricot Production Function
The production function of the apricot tree is given by Torrecillas et al. (2000):
h (Mt−1, wt; γ) = [γ1 · (Mt−1 − PW ) ·KS (Mt) · Z1 (wt) + γ2 · (Mt−1 − PW ) ·KS (Mt) · Z2 (wt)]·areai,
(5)
where h (Mt−1, wt; γ) is the harvest at period t; γ ≡ (γ1, γ2) is a parameter vector that
measures the transformation rate of the production function; areai is the size of the land
(m2) that farmer i owns, KS (Mt) is the hydric stress coeﬃcient (see appendix A.2), Z1 (wt)
is a dummy variable that equals 1 during weeks 18-23 and 0 otherwise:
Z1 (wt) =

1 if 18 ≤ week ≤ 23
0 otherwise
, (6)
and Z2 (wt) is a dummy variable that equals 1 during weeks 24-32 and 0 otherwise:
Z2 (wt) =

1 if 24 ≤ week ≤ 32
0 otherwise
. (7)
The characterization of γ is a direct application of results from the agricultural engineer-
ing literature (Torrecillas et al., 2000; Pérez-Pastor et al., 2009). The parameter γ1 measures
the transformation rate of fruit during the fruit growth season. The parameter γ2 measures
the recovery of the tree during the early post-harvest stress season. Both parameters are
measured in pesetas per liter.24
Given this payoﬀ function, we can compute the farmer's revenue in a given year:
24The production function measures the production in pesetas. But the actual price at which the produc-
tion is sold is determined in the output market. We do not have data on the price at which this production is
sold. So we recover the revenue of the farmers up to this constant (the common price at which the production
of all farmers is sold in apricot market). This price only shifts the the revenue function of all (wealthy and
poor) farmers. So it does not aﬀect our welfare analysis.
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Revenuet =
23∑
wt=18
γ1 ·(Mt−1 − PW ) ·KS (Mt) ·areai+
32∑
wt=24
γ2 ·(Mt−1 − PW ) ·KS (Mt) ·areai. (8)
4 Estimation
We estimate the parameters of the model in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate
the parameters that characterize demand, Θ ≡ (γ, σε, ζ), using data from wealthy farmers,
excluding the data of poor farmers who may be liquidity constrained. In the second stage,
we estimate the vector of ﬁnancial parameters, χ, using the estimated parameters from the
ﬁrst stage, Θˆ. The exclusion restriction for the second stage is that poor farmers have the
same production function as wealthy farmers, up to an idiosyncratic shock. Thus, we assume
that there is no unobserved heterogeneity that aﬀects the production function of wealthy
and poor farmers diﬀerently.
4.1 First Stage: Demand Estimates
In the ﬁrst stage, we construct a two-step conditional choice probability (CCP) estimator
(Hotz and Miller, 1993) to estimate the parameters that characterize demand.
Step 1. In the ﬁrst step we compute transition probability matrices for the following state
variables: moisture, week, price, and rain. As described above, the productivity shocks εijt
are assumed to be i.i.d. Gumbel, so they can be integrated analytically. The transition
probability of the cash holdings is estimated in the second stage. Moisture is a continuous
variable and its evolution over time depends on both the farmers' decisions to buy water
and rainfall. Therefore, certain values of moistness are never reached in the sample, even
when their probability of occurrence is nonzero. To estimate demand, however, we need to
integrate the value function for each possible combination of the state variables in the state
space. Thus, we ﬁrst estimate the CCP using the values (of the state space) reached in the
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sample. Then we use the CCP estimator to predict the CCP on the values (of the state
space) unreached in the sample.25 (See appendix B for details.)
Step 2. In the second step we build an estimator similar to one by proposed by Hotz
et. al (1994). We use the transition matrices to forward simulate the value function from
equation 4. This gives us the predicted CCP by the model as a function of the parameters
Θ ≡ (γ, σε, ζ). The estimated parameters are obtained by minimizing the distance between
the CCP (that are a function of the data and are obtained in the ﬁrst step) and predicted
CCP (that are a function of the parameters).The exclusion restriction for the ﬁrst stage is
that wealthy farmers are not liquidity constrained.
4.2 Second Stage: Financial Parameters
In the second stage, we estimate the ﬁnancial parameters, χ, by maximum likelihood. In the
data we only observe whether the poor farmer buys water or not, in addition to the number
of units purchased. When a farmer does not buy water, we do not know whether it is because
the farmer does not demand water and is not liquidity constrained, or whether the farmer is
liquidity constrained. That is, for the poor farmers, the dependent variable is censored. So we
compute the probability that a poor farmer i is liquidity constrained using the estimates from
the ﬁrst stage. The intuition behind this is that farmers are heterogeneous in two dimensions:
their productivity and liquidity constraints. Thus, a rich farmer and a poor farmer who have
the same number of apricot trees only diﬀer in the idiosyncratic productivity shock and
their cash ﬂow. Using the estimated production function parameters from the ﬁrst stage
(i.e. using the data of the wealthy farmers), we can compute the probability that the poor
farmer is liquidity constrained using the distribution of the idiosyncratic ﬁnancial shock and
treating the farmer's decision variable as a censored variable. This allows us to write the
likelihood of a poor farmer being liquidity constrained (see appendix B.2 for details). The
25We estimate the CCP both non-parametrically (using kernel methods to smooth both discrete and
continuous variables) and parametrically (using a logistic distribution, i.e., a multinomial logit regression).
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exclusion restriction for the second stage is that poor farmers have the same production
function as the wealthy farmers (i.e. no unobserved heterogeneity).
5 Estimation Results
In this subsection, we present the estimation results of the econometric model under diﬀerent
speciﬁcations.
5.1 First Stage Results: Demand Estimates
Table 6 displays the estimation results from the ﬁrst stage of the model from Section 4
(demand parameters Θ ≡ (γ, σε, ζ) from equation 4) using the estimation procedure from
Section 5. We use the apricot production function as outlined in equation 5.
We present four sets of speciﬁcations. In columns 1 to 3 the scale parameter of the Gum-
bel distribution (i.e. distribution of idiosyncratic productivity) is restricted to σε = 1. The
higher the parameter σε, the higher the variance of the distribution of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity. When σε = 1, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is a standard Gumbel,
restricting the heterogeneity of the idiosyncratic productivity. In addition, in columns 1
to 3 we perform the estimation with only one type of farmer who has the median number
of trees from the sample (Area heterogeneity: No ). This means that when we forward
simulate the value function (as outlined in subsection 4.1), areai from equation 5 is set to
the median area for all individual farmers i. In column 1 we restrict the transformation
rate on-season (24 ≤ week ≤ 32) to γ1 = 0. The estimated transformation rate pre-season
(18 ≤ week ≤ 23) is γˆ0 = 0.76. In column 2 we restrict γˆ0 = γˆ1. The overall transformation
rate (i.e. γˆ0 × 1 (18 ≤ week ≤ 23) + γˆ1 × 1 (24 ≤ week ≤ 32)) is similar in magnitude to
column 1. In column 3, there are no restrictions on the transformation rate. The irrigation
cost represents the cost in pesetas that a farmer incurs every time she irrigates.
In the second set of estimates (columns 4 to 6) we repeat the previous speciﬁcations,
29
T
ab
le
6:
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
E
st
im
at
es
E
st
im
a
te
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
T
ra
n
sf
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
0
.7
5
8
9
0
.3
2
4
1
0
.3
9
6
2
0
.7
1
4
5
0
.3
2
4
1
0
.3
9
6
3
0
.7
5
6
0
0
.3
2
8
1
0
.3
9
3
3
0
.7
5
6
0
0
.3
2
8
1
0
.3
6
4
1
p
re
-s
ea
so
n
:
γˆ
0
(0
.1
1
3
6
)
(0
.1
3
5
6
)
(0
.1
9
2
7
)
(0
.0
9
8
3
)
(0
.0
7
3
9
)
(0
.1
7
3
9
)
(0
.1
1
7
2
)
(0
.1
2
0
3
)
(0
.1
2
0
3
)
(0
.1
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
9
9
8
)
(0
.1
1
4
5
)
(1
8
≤
w
ee
k
≤
23
)
T
ra
n
sf
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
0
0
.3
2
4
1
0
.2
7
0
4
0
0
.3
2
4
1
0
.2
7
0
3
0
0
.3
2
8
1
0
.2
7
8
2
0
0
.3
2
8
1
0
.2
76
3
o
n
-s
ea
so
n
:
γˆ
1
−
(0
.1
3
5
6
)
(0
.0
7
1
0
)
−
(0
.0
7
3
9
)
(0
.1
2
7
8
)
−
(0
.1
2
0
3
)
(0
.1
1
4
7
)
−
(0
.0
9
9
8
)
(0
.1
1
5
7
)
(2
4
≤
w
ee
k
≤
32
)
Ir
ri
g
a
ti
n
g
co
st
:
ζˆ
1
0
.0
8
3
9
1
0
.2
3
2
4
1
0
.2
4
3
1
1
0
.1
0
0
3
10
.2
2
7
9
1
0
.2
3
8
4
1
0
.0
8
6
3
1
0.
2
2
7
3
1
0
.2
4
0
2
1
0
.0
8
2
1
1
0
.2
2
2
9
1
0
.2
5
2
8
(2
.7
7
9
3
)
(2
.3
8
7
0
)
(1
.1
9
1
2
)
(2
.1
3
5
7
)
(2
.2
3
3
3
)
(1
.2
8
3
6
)
(2
.9
5
9
2
)
(2
.8
6
2
8
)
(1
.2
4
3
4
)
(2
.0
2
2
9
)
(2
.0
6
5
3
)
(1
.3
8
3
1
)
S
ca
le
p
a
ra
m
et
er
o
f
1
1
1
1
.0
9
6
7
1
.1
7
6
7
1
.1
7
7
8
1
1
1
1
.0
9
5
9
1
.1
5
7
5
1
.1
7
2
8
G
u
m
b
el
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
:
σˆ
ε
−
−
−
(0
.4
9
6
1
)
(0
.3
5
8
6
)
(0
.3
7
1
6
)
−
−
−
(0
.4
8
9
2
)
(0
.3
2
5
3
)
(0
.3
6
8
4
)
C
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
γˆ
1
=
0
γˆ
0
=
γˆ
1
σˆ
ε
=
1
γˆ
1
=
0
γˆ
0
=
γˆ
1
N
o
n
e
γˆ
1
=
0
γˆ
0
=
γˆ
1
σˆ
ε
=
1
γˆ
1
=
0
γˆ
0
=
γˆ
1
N
o
n
e
σˆ
ε
=
1
σˆ
ε
=
1
σˆ
ε
=
1
σˆ
ε
=
1
A
re
a
h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
te
s:
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
.
S
ee
su
b
se
ct
io
n
6
.1
fo
r
d
et
a
il
s
a
b
o
u
t
th
is
ta
b
le
.
30
allowing the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity to have a diﬀerent scale parameter,
which we estimate (i.e. we estimate the parameter σε). The results are similar to the ﬁrst
set of speciﬁcations.
In columns 7 to 9 we perform the estimation with 10 diﬀerent discrete types of farmers,
that only diﬀer in the area (Area heterogeneity: Yes ). The area of each type correspond
to the number of trees of the wealthy farmers in the data (there are 12 wealthy farmers
in the data, but there are two pairs farmers with the same area). Each discrete type has
the same probability. This means that when we forward simulate the value function (as
outlined in subsection 4.1), the value of areai from equation 5 is drawn uniformly at random
from a distribution with discrete support at the points {area1, area2, . . . , area10}. In Table
6 we report the mean Θ ≡ (γ, σε, ζ) across types. The results are similar to the ﬁrst set of
speciﬁcations.
Finally, the fourth set of estimates (columns 10 to 12) allow for both: (1) a diﬀerent scale
parameter for the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity (σε), and (2) farmer heterogeneity
in terms of the area.
5.2 Second Stage Results: Financial Parameter Estimates
We estimate the ﬁnancial parameters, χ, by maximum likelihood using a standard censored
model. See appendix B.2 for details. Table A1 in the in the online appendix displays the
estimates of the ﬁnancial parameters. We use these estimates to compute the probabilities
that a given farmer is liquidity constrained in a given week. Figure 3 displays the empirical
distribution (among the poor farmers) of the Probability of being Liquidity Constrained
(PLC). PLCi = P (ptjit > µit) where i index the poor farmers. Week 24 is the harvest (i.e.
when the farmers collect their cash revenue). As expected, the PLC is close to zero after
week 24 (i.e. after the harvest). This is because the farmers has just collected the cash
revenue and the water need of the trees is low. However, for weeks 1-23 (i.e. before the
harvest), there is substantial heterogeneity among poor farmers: some of the poor farmers
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Figure 3: Probability of Being Liquidity Constrained.
Notes: Week 24 is the harvest (i.e. when the farmers collect their cash revenue). Each vertical line displays
the empirical distribution (among the poor farmers) of the Probability of being Liquidity Constrained (PLC).
PLCi = P (ptjit > µit) where i index the poor farmers (see appendix B.2 for details). Each week of the year
displays a vertical line with: (1) an upper whisker that represents the maximum PLC (that corresponds to
the farmer who has the maximum PLC among the poor farmers); (2) a black circle marker that represents the
mean PLC (the mean PLC among the poor farmers); and (3) a lower whisker that represents the minimum
PLC (that corresponds to the farmer who has the minimum PLC among the poor farmers). If the maximum
PLC coincides with the minimum PLC, then the ﬁgure shows only a dot (which corresponds to the mean
too).
are liquidity constrained with probability one, while others are not liquidity constrained. The
weeks before the harvest are the weeks farthest away from the last harvest and the weeks
when the farmers need the water the most. The mean PLC for weeks 1-23 lies between 5%
and 10%.
6 Welfare
In this section we use the estimated demand system (from the ﬁrst stage) to compare the
welfare under auctions, quotas, and the ﬁrst-best (FB) allocation.
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6.1 Welfare Measures
In this subsection we describe how we construct the welfare measures. Given rainfall and
the allocation of water among the farmers, the yearly average revenue per tree for farmer i
is given by:
Revenuei =
1
# treesi
1
T
T∑
t=1
[Revenueit] =
1
# treesi
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
52∑
wt=1
h (Mi,t−1, wt)− (ζj)
]
(9)
Note that we do not take into account the expenses in water because we are interested
in welfare measures (i.e. transfers are not taken into account).
Welfare is deﬁned as follows:
Welfarei =
1
# treesi
1
T
T∑
t=1
[Welfareit] =
1
# treesi
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
52∑
wt=1
h (Mi,t−1, wt)− (ζj + ijt)
]
(10)
The only diﬀerence between revenue in equation 9 and welfare in equation 10 is the choice
speciﬁc unobservable component, ijt. Since the error term ijt is choice-speciﬁc, the relevant
elements are diﬀerences in ijt across choices, and not ijt. For example, in the case in which
J = 1, the farmer chooses whether to buy 1 unit or not to buy. The farmer balances the
diﬀerence in utility between buying or not, considering both the observable and unobservable
(for the econometrician) components. The probability of a farmer buying water increases
with the expectation of the diﬀerence in ijt, i.e., with E [i1t − i0t].
By construction, the unconditional mean of the diﬀerences in the error term is zero.
Hence, in the quotas system, since the farmers cannot choose when to irrigate, the expec-
tation of the diﬀerence in the error term is zero, i.e., E [i1t − i0t] = 0. However, in the
auction system, farmers choose when to irrigate and the conditional expectation is nonzero.
Farmers are more likely to irrigate when their unobserved utility of irrigation is positive,
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i.e., ˆi1t > ˆi0t. This implies that under the auction system: E [i1t − i0t|j = 1] > 0 and
E [i0t − i1t|j = 0] > 0. In other words, in the auction system, gains from trade are realized.
In the model, gains from trade are translated into the timing of irrigation. Farmers trade
with each other in order to irrigate at their preferred time. For this reason, welfare is always
greater than revenue under the auction system.
We compute the welfare for the following allocation mechanisms: (1) Auctions using
complete units, Ac, wherein complete water units are assigned to the farmer who bought
them as observed in the data; (2) Quotas with random assignment of complete units, Qc,
wherein every time we observe a farmer purchase a unit of water under the auction system,
the complete unit of water is assigned uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of
land) among all farmers; (3) Quotas with sequential assignment of complete units, QcX%,
wherein every time we observe a farmer purchased a unit of water under the auction system,
the complete unit of water is assigned uniformly at random (proportional to their amount
of land) among the X% of farmers who did not receive irrigation the longest;26 (4) Quotas
with random assignment of fractional units, Qf , wherein every time we observe a farmer
purchased a unit of water under the auction system, all farmers are allocated a fraction
26That is, we keep track of when was the last time that each farmer irrigated under the quotas system.
Then, to allocate a unit of water on week t, we only consider the subset of farmers whose last irrigation
was farthest away from t (this is the subset of farmers who value the water the most). Then we allocate
the unit of water uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of land) among this subset of farmers.
The value of X deﬁnes how large is this set. For example, if X = 100%, then all farmers all included in the
set and the unit of water is allocated uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of land) among all
farmers.
Formally, the subset is deﬁned as follows. Let tLasti < t be the last week farmer i was allocated a unit
of water under the quota system. Let I be the total number of farmers and let I be the set of all farmers.
Let us index the farmers according to the last time that each farmer irrigated, being farmer I the one who
irrigated in the week closest to t and being farmer 1 the farmer who irrigated in the week farthest away from
t. Then tLast1 ≤ tLast2 ≤ tLast3 ≤ · · · ≤ tLastI . (Note that such ranking can always be done and, typically,
can be done using several strict inequalities, depending on how many units have been allocated in the past.)
Let X = x/I × 100 for x ∈ 1, 2, . . . , I. So given X, we can compute x = X/100 × I. Then, under QcX% we
allocate the unit of water uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of land) among the subset of
farmers I˜X% ≡ {i ∈ I : i ≤ x, with x = X/100× I}. For example, if I = 10, tLast1 ≤ tLast2 ≤ tLast3 < tLast4 ≤
· · · ≤ tLast10 , and X = 30%, then x = 30/100 × 10 = 3 and I˜30% = {1, 2, 3}. So, we allocate the unit of water
uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of land) among farmers indexed as 1, 2, and 3. These are
the three farmers whose last irrigation was farthest away from t. In case of ties, we include all tied farmers
in the subset I˜. In the previous example, if if tLast1 ≤ tLast2 ≤ tLast3 = tLast4 = tLast5 < tLast6 ≤ · · · ≤ tLast10 ,
then I˜30% = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
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of that unit (proportional to their amount of land); and (5) the ﬁrst-best allocation using
complete units, FBc, wherein every time we observe a farmer purchased a unit of water
under the auction system, the complete unit of water is assigned to the farmer who value the
water the most. In all cases (Ac, Qc, QcX%, and FBc) we compute the welfare measures
using the actual allocation of water from the data under the auctions system (i.e. the total
amount of water allocated in all mechanisms is the same) and the estimates in column 12
from table 6.27
As explained in subsection 2.3, the quota system in Mula allocates the units in sequential
rounds of three weeks. Qc25% is closest to this system. We now describe how we compute
the welfare measures under each mechanism.
Auctions using Complete Units (Ac)
We compute both the revenue and the welfare.
• Poor farmers: We compute the revenue using the estimated demand system (i.e.
Θˆ ≡
(
γˆ, σˆε, ζˆ
)
) and the actual purchases made by poor farmers. We use equations
9 (revenue) and 10 (welfare), and the moisture level in the farmers' plots (i.e. the
moisture resulting from their actual purchase decisions).
• Wealthy farmers: We compute the revenue using the estimated demand system
(i.e. Θˆ ≡
(
γˆ, σˆε, ζˆ
)
) and the actual purchases made by wealthy farmers. We use
equations 9 (revenue) and 10 (welfare), and moisture level in the farmers' plots (i.e.
the moisture resulting from their actual purchase decisions). Note that the revenue for
wealthy farmers can be greater than the FBc average revenue. This is because poor
farmers are sometimes liquidity constrained, so wealthy farmers buy more water than
the amount required by the FBc allocation.
27We obtain similar results simulating the purchase decisions under the auction system and then using
the resulting allocation of water to compute the welfare under quotas and FBc. Results are available upon
request.
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Quotas (Q)
Revenue and welfare coincide under the quota system because farmers do not choose when
to irrigate. We only report one measured that we call welfare.
As explained in Section 2, in this paper we focus on the 24 farmers who only grow apricot
trees. These farmers bought 633 units of water under the auction system over the sample
period. Under the quota system, we allocate the same number of units of water (633 units)
in the same week when these units were bought under the auction. We consider three main
quota scenarios. In each scenario we allocate units among the farmers as follows:
• Quotas with random assignment of complete units, Qc: every time we observe
that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auction on a particular date, the
complete unit of water is assigned uniformly at random (proportional to their amount
of land) among all farmers.
• Quotas with non random assignment of complete units, QcX%: every time
we observe that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auctions on a particular
date, the complete unit of water is assigned uniformly at random (proportional to their
amount of land) among the X% of farmers who did not receive irrigation the longest,
on the same date.28 29
• Quotas with random assignment of fractional units, Qf : every time we observe
that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auctions on a particular date, all
farmers are allocated a fraction of that unit, proportional to their amount of land, on
the same date.
28For example, in Qc50%, complete units of water are allocated among the 50% of farmers who did not
receive irrigation the longest; in Qc25%, complete units of water are allocated among the 25% of farmers
who did not receive irrigation the longest; and so on.
29As indicated in footnote 26, under QcX% we need to keep track of when was the last time that each
farmer irrigated under the quota system. We do not have this information for the initial weeks in the sample.
So, under under QcX%, we allocate units uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of land) at
the beginning of the sample as described in the procedure in footnote 26.
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In Qc and QX% units are allocated uniformly at random (proportional to their amount of
land) among the corresponding set of farmers. We simulate the allocation S = 1, 000 times
under Qc and QX%. In Table 7 we report the mean welfare measures across simulations.
(In Qf all farmers are allocated a fraction of the unit proportional to their amount of land,
so there is no need to simulate diﬀerent allocations.)
First Best using Complete Units (FBc)
We compute the ﬁrst best allocation using complete units (FBc) allocation as follows. Every
time we observe that a farmer bought a unit of water during the auctions on a particular
date, the complete unit of water is assigned to the farmer who values the water the most on
such date.
6.2 Welfare Results
Table 7 displays the the welfare results under auctions, quotas, and the FBc allocation. We
report the mean welfare per farmer, per tree, and per year. The bottom part of the table
shows the mean number of units per farmer (during the whole period under analysis) under
each mechanism. The total amount of water is the same across all mechanisms (i.e. 633
units). The diﬀerences in welfare across columns are a consequence of diﬀerences in moisture
across farmers.
As expected, under the auction system, poor farmers have a lower welfare than wealthy
farmers. The quotas system increases poor farmers' revenue and decreases wealthy farmers'
revenue. Table 7 shows that the following ranking holds in terms of eﬃciency: FB >
Qc25% > Qc50% ∼= Ac > Qf ∼= Qc, where a greater than inequality indicates greater
welfare and where the symbol ∼= indicates that the welfare is not statistically diﬀerent.
That is, randomly allocating the complete units of water, in proportion to amount of land,
results in a decrease in eﬃciency relative to auctions. In Qc50%, complete units of water are
allocated among the 50% of farmers who have received less water in the past, in proportion to
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their amount of land. The welfare under Qc50% is not statistically diﬀerent than the welfare
under Ac. (Recall that the welfare under Qc is simulated S times.) In Qc25%, complete
units of water are allocated among the 25% of farmers who have received less water in the
past, in proportion to amount of land. The welfare under Qc25% is greater than under Ac.
In Mula, the quota allocation mechanism was closer to Qc25% than to Qc because every
farmer was assigned a certain amount of water every three weeks (the duration of a round),
proportional to their plot's size.
Auctions, Quotas, and First Best. Figure 4 shows the welfare comparison among auc-
tions Ac, the FBc allocation, and quotas QcX% for X ∈ [1, 2, . . . , 100]%. (Note that
auctions Ac and FBc are constant in X.) The ﬁgure shows the mean welfare per farmer, per
tree, and per year. (The welfare measures are the same as in Table 7.) The main diﬀerence
between FBc and auctions is that poor farmers do not buy much water during the critical
season under auctions Ac. Qc100% is equivalent to quotas with random assignment of com-
plete units, Qc. Allocating randomly the complete units of water, in proportion to amount
of land, results in a decrease in eﬃciency relative to auctions. This is due to decreasing
marginal returns of the apricot production function. Although all farmers receive the same
amount of water per tree, the timing of the allocation is important.30 On the other hand, as
X decreases, the quota system QcX% allocates units among the farmers who irrigated less in
the past. This is similar to the FBc allocation, where water is allocated to the farmer who
values the water the most. In the limit, as X decreases enough, the welfare under QcX% is
similar to the welfare under FBc.
In practice, varying X is equivalent to varying the duration of the round. Long round
means farmers do not irrigate often, while short rounds means that farmers have to incur
the irrigation cost often.
30For example, consider the case of two identical farmers (A and B). Suppose there are four units of water
to be allocated in four subsequent weeks (1, 2, 3, and 4). Allocating the ﬁrst two units during weeks 1 and
2 to farmer A, and the second two units during weeks 3 and 4 to farmer B, results in a lower welfare than
allocating the ﬁrst unit to A, the second unit to B, the third unit to A, and the fourth to B.
39
Figure 4: Welfare Comparison: Auctions, Quotas, and First Best
Notes: See subsection 6.1 for a discussion about the computation of the welfare measures.
Yearly Results. Figure 5 shows the welfare results by year (1955 to 1965) and by alloca-
tion mechanism(Ac, Qc, Qc50%, and FBc). There is substantial variation across years, due
to variation in rainfall. Revenue is lowest for both poor and wealthy farmers during 1962-63,
the driest years in our sample (see Figure 3 in appendix A).
The top two panels in Figure 5 display the welfare disaggregated by poor and wealthy
farmers under Ac, Qc, Qc50%, and FBc. Although the overall performance of Ac is similar
to Qc, the distribution is diﬀerent. As expected, wealthy farmers perform better under Ac
than under Qc50%. Poor farmers perform better under Qc50% than under Ac. Indeed,
during drought years (such as 1958, 1963, and 1964) poor farmers perform better under Qc
than under Ac. The diﬀerence between Ac and FBc is the highest in 1963, the year with
the highest drought in the sample. The drought increased the price of water relative to the
other years in the sample. The negative impact of this drought on poor farmers under Ac
(top left panel) was greater than its positive impact on wealthy farmers (top right panel).
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Figure 5: Welfare by Year.
Notes: See subsection 6.1 for a discussion about the computation of the welfare measures.
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7 Discussion
Unobserved Heterogeneity. The diﬀerences in production (as a measure of welfare) in
Table 7 are due to diﬀerences in soil moisture levels (i.e. some farmers irrigate more than
others) since our speciﬁcation assumes that all farmers are equally productive, up to an
idiosyncratic productivity shock. An alternative explanation would be that diﬀerences in
production are due to unobserved diﬀerences in productivity. For example, it could be that
wealthy farmers used additional productive inputs (e.g. fertilizers, hired labor, manure, etc.)
in greater quantities than did poor farmers. Thus, the argument continues, poor farmers'
production would be lower than wealthy farmers' production due to both diﬀerences in soil
moisture levels and greater use of these additional productive inputs.
We cannot rule out this argument because (1) our econometric speciﬁcation does not
allow for persistent diﬀerences in productivity among farmers, and (2) we have no data about
the relative use of these additional productive inputs. However, we believe this would not
aﬀect our counterfactual results from Table 7 for two reasons. First, if wealthy farmers used
additional productive inputs in greater quantities than did poor farmers, the transition from
auctions to quotas would increase the production of poor farmers more than we predicted
in the counterfactual from Table 7. This is because, under quotas, farmers do not have to
pay for the water (only the maintenance costs of the channel which are substantially lower
than the price of water in the auction), leaving them extra cash to buy additional productive
inputs (unless one argues that poor farmers had no access to these additional productive
inputs due to, for example, a knowledge advantage of the wealthy farmers).
Second, the estimated scale parameter, σˆε, in Table 6 is close to one (columns 4-6 and
10-12). This indicates that allowing the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
εijt, to have a diﬀerent variance, does not aﬀect the estimates signiﬁcantly. We interpret this
as indirect evidence that farmers' heterogeneity is not large. Note that this is an informal
argument because, as noted in point (1) above, our econometric speciﬁcation does not allows
for persistent diﬀerences in productivity among farmers.
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Strategic Supply. The president of the Heredamiento de Aguas made the decision whether
to run the auction or not. There is no evidence that running the auction, or not, was a
strategic decision. If there was enough water in the dam, the auction was held. However,
the president could stop the auction at any time, and indeed used to do just that if the price
fell considerably, usually to less than 1 peseta. This uncommon situation happened only
after an extraordinary rainy season. The president's decision about when and whether to
sell water was proﬁt-maximizing, not necessary welfare-maximizing.
Strategic Size and Sunk Cost. The results obtained when comparing revenue from
quotas and auctions suggest that the choice of the unit size in the auction (i.e. three hours
of irrigation) was not innocuous. In particular, the fact that in some years poor farmers
under the quota system produced higher revenue than wealthy farmers under the auction
system suggests that the size of the units sold at the auction might be too large. The size
of the units sold at auction has not changed since the middle ages. This could be due to
institutional persistence or due to technical reasons. For example, three hours could be the
size that maximizes revenue. So it could be the case that 3 hours maximizes proﬁts, but not
welfare.
As shown in Donna and Espín-Sánchez (2015), there is a sunk cost to the ﬁrst unit of
water allocated to a plot because the dry channel absorbs some water. Subsequent units
associated with the same channel ﬂow through a wet channel, thus, the loss is negligible. In
the auction system, subsequent units are allocated to diﬀerent farmers, depending on who
has won each unit. The optimal size of the unit (i.e. the size of the unit that maximizes
welfare) would be determined by a trade-oﬀ between the sunk cost incurred every time a
farmer irrigates, due to the loss of water ﬂowing through a dry channel, and the diminishing
return of water. In the quota system, units are allocated to each farmer in geographical
order (i.e. every unit is allocated to a neighbor farmer down the channel with respect to the
previous farmer).31
31In the neighboring city of Lorca, auctions are carried out independently for farmers with lands in each
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Optimal Crop Mix. Our analysis only considers the case in which farmers grow apricot
trees. Since diﬀerent agricultural products have diﬀerent irrigation needs in diﬀerent seasons,
the optimal crop mix involves diversifying among several agricultural products with diﬀerent
irrigation needs. For example, oranges are harvested in winter, and their need for water peaks
in December. Apricots are harvested in summer, and their need for water peaks in May-
June. Hence, a crop mix with apricot and orange trees would outperform one with just
apricot trees. We observe this optimal mix in the data. Many farmers have orange trees and
either apricot, peach, or lemon trees, all three of which are harvested during summer. In
this paper we focus on the set of farmers who only grow apricot trees because they have the
same production function. This allows us to account for unobserved heterogeneity without
modeling it, as discussed above in this section.
Trees. Quotas are desirable during a drought because they allocate a certain amount of
water periodically to each farmer. Quotas also function as insurance for farmers, who have
less uncertainty when carrying out risky investments, such as trees. A tree takes several
years to be fully productive, but will die if it does not get enough water in any given year.
On the other hand, vegetables grow more quickly than trees, and can be harvested within a
year of planting. Hence, a farmer with a secure supply of water is more likely to plant trees
and receive a higher expected proﬁt from them.
Liquidity Constraints vs Risk Aversion. One of the concerns in identifying liquidity
constraints (LC) is that some empirical implications of markets where agents face LC are
similar to those of markets where agents are risk averse. In particular, poor farmers buying
water before the critical season (i.e. before the uncertainty about the rain is realized) is
consistent with both LC and risk aversion. We now use the response of poor farmers to their
purchase timing to investigate this concern.
The main diﬀerence in farmers' behavior under LC and risk aversion occurs during the
sub-channel. This way, the water has to travel shorter distances and the amount of water lost is smaller.
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summer, when prices are high. If poor farmers are liquidity constrained, then they will not
be able to buy water when the price is high, even if the moisture level in their plots is low.
On the other hand, if farmers are unconstrained, but risk averse, they will have the same
demand for water as wealthy farmers during the summer, after the weather uncertainty is
realized in Spring before the critical season, conditional on soil moisture levels.32 Column
4 in Table 4 shows that holding the moisture level ﬁxed, poor farmers buy less water than
wealthy farmers. Following the results in this table, along with the opinions presented in
above, we conclude that poor farmers were liquidity constrained.33
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we empirically investigate the welfare eﬀect of a historical institutional change
from auctions to quotas. A market institution, an auction, was active for more than 700
years in the southern Spanish town of Mula. The system allocated water to farmers for
agricultural purposes. In 1966, a ﬁxed quotas system replaced the auctions. Under the
quota system, farmers who owned a plot of fertile land were entitled to a ﬁxed amount of
water, proportional to the size of their plot, for irrigation.
In the absence of frictions, a water auction is eﬃcient because it allocates water according
to the valuation of the bidders. When frictions are present, however, markets may not be
eﬃcient. Frictions arose in Mula because farmers had to pay cash for water won in the
auction, but did not always have enough cash during the critical season, when they needed
water the most. When farmers are liquidity constrained, the eﬃciency of auctions relative
to quotas is ambiguous. It is then an empirical question which institution is more eﬃcient.
We show that, as some historians have suggested, some farmers were liquidity constrained
32The same argument rules out the possibility that the results are driven by poor farmers being more
impatient than wealthy farmers.
33In this paper we abstract from diﬀerences in prices within the week (i.e. Monday to Friday, and Day
to Night). However, diﬀerences in prices within the week can also be used to asses the importance of LC.
As shown in Donna end Espín-Sánchez (2015) prices are higher for night-time irrigation and higher earlier
in the week (prices on Mondays are higher than on Fridays). Although not reported here, we ﬁnd that that
poor farmers are more likely to buy water during nights and later in the week.
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in Mula. Poor farmers bought less water than wealthy farmers during the critical season
and obtained lower revenue per tree as a consequence. To compute welfare under auctions
and quotas, we ﬁrst estimate the demand system. To estimate demand, it is necessary to
account for three features of the empirical setting: intertemporal substitution eﬀect, liquidity
constraints, and weather seasonality. Ignoring the presence of liquidity constraints (LC)
biases estimated (inverse) demand and demand elasticity downwards.
We use the estimated demand system to compare welfare under auctions, quotas, and
the ﬁrst best allocation. We conclude that a necessary condition for quotas to increase
eﬃciency relative to the auction in our setting, is that units of water are allocated according
to farmers' valuations. In Mula, the institutional change improved eﬃciency (the quotas
generated greater welfare than the market). Hence, the end of the water market in Mula
was a settled problem of irrigation.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, from a historical perspective, we
provide empirical evidence of a source of ineﬃciency in water markets. We also provide
empirical support for the institutional change proposed in Espín-Sánchez (2015). Second,
we propose a dynamic model that includes storability, seasonality, and LC. We discuss the
relationship between storability and LC, and show that ignoring the presence of LC biases
the estimated demand downwards.
The empirical results in this paper apply only to our empirical setting. One should not
conclude that all water markets are ineﬃcient. We have presented an empirical framework
with the main ingredients found in other water markets: seasonal demand, storability, and
LC. Accounting for the speciﬁcs of other empirical settings, our framework can be used to
assess the eﬃciency of water markets in those settings.
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